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This article discusses the revised Article 7(4) of the European Communities’ Proposal for a
Second Council Directive on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provi-
sions Relating to the Taking-up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions. The article
argues that the revision of the proposal for the Second Directive by the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities will mainly have two effects. First, the Commission’s review procedure will
no longer be on a case-by-case basis, but on a country-by-country basis; the Commission will
no longer interfere with an individual authorization procedure before the competent authorities
of a Member State. Second, the suspension of future authorizations depends on a finding by the
Commission that a specific country does not grant national treatment to EEC institutions; lack of
reciprocity is no longer a basis for a denial of an application. This new approach will allow the
Commission to defend against discriminations against EEC institutions abroad, while respecting
different banking policies in third countries.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 1988, the Commission of the European
Communities submitted to the Council of Ministers of the Eu-
ropean Communities a Proposal for a Second Council Direc-
tive on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administra-
tive Provisions Relating to the Taking-up and Pursuit of the
Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive
77/780/EEC (the "Second Directive").' A number of proce-
dural steps are necessary before the proposed Second Direc-
tive becomes law in the European Economic Community (the
"EEC" or "Community"). 2 As it winds its way through the
1. COM(87) 715 final, O.J. C 84/1 (1988) [hereinafter Second Directive].
2. The enactment of the proposed Second Directive requires the following
steps: opinion of the European Parliament; opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee; the Council's common position; second reading of the European Parlia-
ment; and finally, the adoption by the Council of Ministers. Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 100, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
(Cmd. 5179-I) at 37-38 (official English version), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 54 (1958) (unoffi-
cial English trans.) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]; Single European Act, art. 18, O.J. L
169/1, at 8 (1987). Directives do not, in general, have the force of directly binding
law, but rather obligate the Member States to take appropriate measures to imple-
ment the provisions of the directives. Directives, therefore, as a rule have no effect
for persons until the appropriate implementing provisions have been adopted by the
Member States. Directives are intended to indicate the goal to be attained, but leave
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political process, changes may be negotiated and the final Sec-
ond Directive may vary from the proposed Second Directive.
Nevertheless, it is the general conviction of bankers and law-
yers in Europe3 that the Second Directive will become EEC law
in some form or other.
It is already clear that the Second Directive will pro-
foundly affect the way in which banks will do business in the
EEC principally in two ways: first, a common EEC banking
market4 will promote the growth of EEC banks and make them
stronger competitors in the EEC as well as in the world market;
second, non-EEC banks will have to obtain approval on the ba-
sis of reciprocity before they can do business on an EEC-wide
basis. Since the Second Directive will make it more difficult for
non-EEC banks to establish or acquire a banking subsidiary in
the EEC while at the same time making it easier for EEC banks
to compete in other Member States, it is important for non-
EEC banks to be aware of the upcoming changes and to pre-
pare themselves for the implementation of these changes
before the restrictions of the Second Directive become effec-
tive.
This Article describes the principal provisions of the Sec-
ond Directive and discusses how they will affect non-EEC
banks.
I. THE FIRST BANKING COORDINATION DIRECTIVE
The First Banking Coordination Directive (the "First Di-
rective"), 5 which was adopted in 1977, created the basis for the
it to the Member States to set forth the manner in which this is to be accomplished.
The obligation to implement a directive does, however, include an obligation to com-
ply with the deadline that the directive prescribes. Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
4902.21.
3. "Europe" as used in this article means the EEC.
4. The banking market will be comprised of the countries that are members of
the EEC ("Member States"). Member States are the following 12 countries:
Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
United Kingdom,. Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. "EEC banks" and
"EEC credit institutions" as used in this article mean credit institutions authorized as
such in a Member State. For the definition of "credit institution," see infra note 30
and accompanying text.
5. First Council Directive of 12 December 1977 on the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking up and Pursuit of
the Business of Credit Institutions (77/780/EEC), Oj. L 322/30 (1977) [hereinafter
First Directive].
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harmonization of banking laws in the EEC. Fifteen recitals in
its preamble broadly identify the areas that the EEC considers
the main targets for harmonization.6 The recitals call for the
enactment of legal provisions that roughly can be grouped into
five categories: (1) rules abolishing barriers along Member
State borders with respect to the provision of banking services,
(2) rules providing for the freedom of EEC credit institutions
to establish branches in other Member States, (3) uniform
rules concerning essential authorization requirements for
credit institutions, (4) uniform rules concerning essential su-
pervisory standards, and (5) rules providing for (uniform)
treatment of non-EEC credit institutions.
According to the First Directive, each Member State must
require each credit institution to obtain an authorization in
such Member State, as its country of origin, before commenc-
ing its activities.7 The First Directive establishes certain mini-
mum standards for such an authorization.8 Freedom of estab-
lishment of branches, as understood by the preamble to the
First Directive, means that a credit institution having its head
office in one Member State does not need any additional au-
thorization from another Member State when setting up a
branch in that Member State.9 The First Directive, however,
takes only the first step towards the implementation of this
goal. It does not prohibit a Member State from requiring that
an EEC credit institution domiciled in another Member State
obtain an authorization for the establishment of a branch in its
territory;10 but, it requires such an authorization to be granted
on the basis of "national treatment," i.e., "subject to authori-
6. See id. whereas clauses, at 30-31.
7. Id. art. 3(1), at 33. "Authorization" is defined in the First Directive as "an
instrument issued in any form by the authorities by which the right to carry on the
business of a credit institution is granted." Id. art. 1, at 31.
8. Id. art. 3(2)-(3), at 33. The First Directive also provides that a credit institu-
tion that commenced business in accordance with the laws of the Member State in
which it has its head office before the entry into force of the First Directive shall be
deemed to be authorized. Id. art. 10(1), at 35-36.
9. See id. tenth whereas clause, at 31; see also Second Directive, supra note 1, art.
5(1), at 3 (eliminating the requirement of authorization by Host Member States for
credit institutions authorized in other Member States).
10. See First Directive, supra note 5, art. 4(4), at 34 ("[Tlhe laws of Member
States requiring a separate authorization for each branch of a credit institution hav-
ing its head office in their territory shall apply equally to the branches of credit insti-
tutions the head offices of which are in other Member States.").
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zation according to the law and procedure applicable to credit
institutions established on their territory.""
The First Directive does not provide protection from pro-
tectionist or discriminatory measures of Member States in con-
nection with the establishment and operation of branches of
non-EEC credit institutions in Member States. Member States
are merely obliged not to grant more favorable treatment to
branches of non-EEC credit institutions than that accorded to
EEC credit institutions' 2 and to notify the Commission of all
authorizations of branches of non-EEC credit institutions.' 3
Nothing is said in the operative part of the First Directive
about the establishment of subsidiaries of non-EEC credit insti-
tutions in the EEC.
The Second Directive, as will be shown below, contains
provisions regarding the establishment of credit institution
subsidiaries of non-EEC credit institutions' 4 and also takes the
final step towards full implementation of the freedom to estab-
lish branches of EEC credit institutions.' 5 The First Directive,
however, remains the principal source of EEC law regarding
the establishment of branches in Member States by non-EEC
credit institutions. In this respect, the First Directive will not
be superseded by the Second Directive.' 6
II. THE SECOND DIRECTIVE
After the implementation of the First Directive, three ob-
stacles to freedom of establishment of branches in other Mem-
ber States still remain for EEC credit institutions. First, an
EEC credit institution wishing to set up a branch in another
11. Id. art. 4(1), at 34; see also supra note 10.
12. Id. art. 9(1), at 35; see also id. art. 9(3), at 35 (giving the Community power to
enter into agreements with a country outside the Community pursuant to which the
Community may accord to branches of a credit institution from that country, on the
basis of reciprocity, identical treatment throughout the EEC).
13. Id. art. 9(2), at 35.
14. See infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
16. See Second Directive, supra note 1, seventeenth whereas clause, at 2 (the pro-
cedures established in the First Directive "notably in relation to the authorization of
branches of credit institutions authorized in third countries, should continue to apply
to such institutions"); see also Comm'n of the European Communities, Proposal for a
Second Council Directive, COM (87) 715 final, at 1.1 (Feb. 16, 1988) [hereinafter
Explanatory Memorandum] (explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal
for the Second Directive).
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Member State still has to be authorized by the banking authori-
ties of the host country; second, it remains subject to supervi-
sion by the host country and to restrictions in host country
laws on the range of permitted activities; and third, in most
Member States, branches have to be provided with earmarked
"endowment capital," as if they were new banks. 17 All of these
restrictions would be removed under the Second Directive by
the end of 1992. Along with other accompanying EEC regula-
tions in the banking sector (on own funds, 8 large exposures, 19
harmonized solvency ratios, 20 deposit-guarantee schemes21 ),
the Second Directive is intended to:
-Remove the remaining barriers to freedom of establish-
ment of branches; and
-grant full freedom to provide financial services through-
out the EEC.22
The objective of the Second Directive is to create a truly
internal market in banking. Any credit institution authorized
in a Member State of the EEC will be able to establish branches
and to offer its services freely throughout the Community to
individuals and businesses. 23 The harmonization of the bank-
ing sector is part of the general attempt to complete the crea-
tion of the internal European market. 24 The approach of the
Second Directive is based on the policy decisions endorsed in a
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council
entitled "Completing the Internal Market." (the "White Pa-
17. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at 1.3.
18. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Own Funds of Credit Institutions
COM(86) 169 final 2, O.J. C 243/4 (1986). "Own funds" is defined as "the credit
institution's own capital, including items which may be treated as capital under na-
tional rules." First Directive, supra note 5, art. 1, at 31; Second Directive, supra note
1, art. 1, at 3; see infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
19. Commission Recommendation of 22 December 1986 on Monitoring and
Controlling Large Exposures of Credit Institutions (87/62/EEC), OJ. L 33/10
(1987).
20. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Solvency Ratio for Credit Institutions
COM(88) 194 final, OJ. C 135/4 (1988).
21. Commission Recommendation of 22 December 1986 Concerning the Intro-
duction of Deposit-Guarantee Schemes in the Community (87/63/EEC), O.J. L
33/16 (1987).
22. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at I. l;see also Second Directive,
supra note 1, first whereas clause, at 1.
23. See Second Directive, supra note 1, tenth whereas clause, at 2.
24. See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to
the European Council, COM(85) 310 final (June 14, 1985) [hereinafter White Paper].
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per").25 In accordance with the White Paper, the Second Di-
rective does not create a uniform body of banking law for the
EEC. However, it obligates each Member State to mutually
recognize the laws of and licenses from other Member States.
These laws and licenses will remain different from Member
State to Member State, while only a few essential supervisory
standards will be harmonized in the banking laws of the Mem-
ber States. 26 The White Paper suggests that such harmoniza-
tion, as far as it concerns the supervision of ongoing activities
of credit institutions, should be guided by the principle of
"home country control," according to which the primary task
of supervising a credit institution should be attributed to the
competent authorities of the institution's Member State of ori-
gin.
7
Authorization for the establishment or the acquisition of a
credit institution subsidiary by a non-EEC person in the EEC is
subject to a finding by the Commission that EEC credit institu-
tions enjoy reciprocal treatment, in particular, regarding the
establishment of a subsidiary or the acquisition of a participa-
tion in a credit institution, in the non-EEC country in ques-
tion.2 s
The Second Directive is addressed to the Member States.
They must conform their laws to the Second Directive at the
latest by January 1, 1993.29
III. THE SINGLE BANKING LICENSE: FREEDOM OF
ESTABLISHMENT AND FREEDOM TO
PROVIDE SERVICES
A. Mutual Recognition of Banking Licenses
The Second Directive will permit any credit institution3 0
25. Id. 101-107.
26. Id. 102-103.
27. Id. 103.
28. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(5), at 4; see infra notes 122-31 and ac-
companying text.
29. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 22(1), at 9.
30. "Credit institution" is defined in article 1 of the First Directive as "an under-
taking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public
and to grant credits for its own account." First Directive, supra note 5, art. 1, at 31.
The definition of the First Directive is incorporated into the Second Directive. See
Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 1, it 3; see also infra notes 74-82 and accompanying
text. Article 2(2) of the First Directive, as amended by Council Directive of 27 Octo-
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authorized 3 in a Member State (the "Home Member State")32
(i) to establish branches in other Member States 33 and (ii) to
offer its services freely throughout the Community to individu-
als and businesses.3 ' This is the centerpiece of the Second Di-
rective.
EEC credit institutions will be entitled to operate under
their Home Member State license, which will be a "single.
banking license" throughout the Community.3 5 The Home
Member State license will permit a credit institution to supply
certain banking services, which are enumerated in the Second
Directive, in other Member States (the "Host Member
State")3 6 either by acting itself across the border or through a
branch (but not through a subsidiary credit institution),37 which it
ber 1986 amending Directive 77/780/EEC in Respect of the List of Permanent Ex-
clusions of Certain Credit Institutions (86/524/EEC), O.J. L 309/15 (1986) [herein-
after Amending Directive], excludes, inter alia, the following institutions from the
scope of the First Directive and Second Directive: central banks of Member States,
post office giro institutions, and individually specified institutions of the different
Member States, that serve (semi-) official purposes. Id. at 15-16.
31. "Authorization" is defined in article 1 of the First Directive as "an instru-
ment issued in any form by the authorities by which the right to carry on the business
of a credit institution is granted." First Directive, supra note 5, art. 1, at 31. The
definition of authorization in the First Directive is incorporated into the Second Di-
rective, supra note 1, art. 1, at 3.
32. See the definition of "home Member State" in the Second Directive, supra
note 1, art. 1, at 3.
33. Id. art. 5(1), at 3. "Branch" is defined in article I of the First Directive as
a place of business which forms a legally dependent part of a credit institu-
tion and which conducts directly all or some of the operations inherent in
the business of credit institutions; any number of branches set up in the
same Member State by a credit institution having its head office in another
Member State shall be regarded as a single branch ....
First Directive, supra note 1, art. 1, at 31. The definition of branch in the First Direc-
tive is incorporated into the Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 1, at 3.
34. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(1), at 7.
35. Id. second whereas clause, at 1; see id. art. 5(1), at 3.
36. "Host Member State" is defined in article 1 of the Second Directive as "the
Member State where a credit institution has a branch or into which it supplies serv-
ices." Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 1, at 3.
37. In contrast to a branch, a subsidiary institution is an entity legally independ-
ent from the parent credit institution. "Subsidiary" is defined in article 1 of the Sec-
ond Directive by reference to article 1 of the Seventh Council Directive, OJ. L 193/1,
at 2 (1983), as an undertaking in which a parent undertaking has a majority of the
shareholders' or members' voting rights, or has the right to appoint or remove a
majority of the administrative, management, or supervisory body and is at the same
time a shareholder, or which can be controlled by the parent undertaking by means
of other arrangements or rights. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 1, at 3.
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may establish anywhere in the EEC, without any further au-
thorization by the Host Member State.18 Thus, the Second Di-
rective does not create a European "federal" banking license;
it decrees that each Member State's banking license shall be
valid throughout the EEC. The principle proposed by the Sec-
ond Directive is one of "mutual recognition": each Member
State recognizes the banking license of the other Member
States. This principle differs radically from the concept of "na-
tional treatment ' 3 9 prevailing in the United States. "National
treatment" means that a foreign bank is entitled to the same
treatment as a domestic bank and that it will not be subject to
discrimination. The principle of mutual recognition gives
credit institutions licensed in one Member State access to all
Member States.40 This EEC-wide access creates an inter-Mem-
ber State banking market, which differs from the single-state
U.S. banking market.4 '
The recognition of the Home Member State license re-
quired by the Second Directive is limited to certain specified
banking activities: the Home Member State license is valid in
other Member States only with respect to those specified bank-
ing activities that are enumerated in the annex to the Second
Directive (the "Annex").4 2 The Annex defines the scope of the
principle of mutual recognition. Each Member State will have
the duty to ensure that at least the activities listed in the Annex
may be pursued in its territory by any credit institution author-
ized and supervised by the competent authorities of its Home
Member State, either through the establishment of a branch or
by way of provision of services across the Member State bor-
38. Id. art. 5(1), at 3.
39. The International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3101 (1982), incorpo-
rates the principle of national treatment as a basis for the rules governing the entry
and subsequent operations of foreign banks. See Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Policy Statement on Supervision and Regulation of Foreign-Based
Bank Holding Companies, 1 Fed. Res. Reg. Serv. 4-835 (Apr. 1983); Gruson &Jack-
son, Issuance of Securities by Foreign Banks and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 1980 U.
ILL. L.F. 185, 198 n.82; Orr, Reciprocity and Regulation of Entry, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
333; see also Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 715 F.2d 604, 617
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984).
40. Second Directive, supra note 1, arts. 5(1), 16(1), at 3, 7.
41. See infra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
42. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(1), at 7; see infra notes 48-53 and ac-
companying text.
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der.45
The authorization by its Home Member State will permit a
credit institution to provide services throughout the Commu-
nity with respect to banking activities that meet the following
cumulative criteria: (1) the Home Member State license must
permit the pursuit of such activity, and (2) the activity must be
set out in the Annex.44
As a consequence, any credit institution authorized as
such in its Home Member State may exercise activities that
meet such criteria in the Host Member State even if the same
activities are not permitted to similar credit institutions of the
Host Member State. For instance, if a bank is authorized by its
Home Member State license to engage in financial leasing
transactions, it is permitted to do so anywhere in the EEC,
since financial leasing is an activity listed in the Annex. On the
other hand, if the Home Member State license does not au-
thorize financial leasing, a credit institution may not engage in
this activity in a Host Member State even if credit institutions
licensed in the Host Member State are entitled to engage in
this activity. If the Home Member State license permits travel
agency services, a credit institution still cannot conduct this ac-
tivity in a Host Member State by virtue of the Second Directive,
because travel agency services are not set forth in the Annex.
Any credit institution wishing for the first time to exercise
the freedom to supply services in the territory of another Mem-
ber State must notify the competent authorities 45 of the Home
Member State of the activities included in the Annex that it
intends to undertake.46 Such notice will simply be forwarded
to the competent authorities of the Host Member State.47
43. Second Directive, supra note 1, arts. 5(1), 16(1), at 3, 7.
44. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(l), at 7; see infra notes 48-53 and ac-
companying text.
45. "Competent authorities" is defined in article 1 of the Second Directive by
reference to Council Directive of 13 June 1983 on the Supervision of Credit Institu-
tions on a Consolidated Basis (83/850/EEC), O.J. L 193/18, at 19 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Directive on Consolidated Supervision], as the national authorities which are em-
powered by law or regulation to supervise credit institutions. Second Directive, supra
note 1, art. 1, at 3.
46. Id. art. 18(1), at 8.
47. Id. art. 18(2), at 8.
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B. The Agreed List of "Banking Activities"
The core of the proposed Second Directive is the single
banking license and, associated with it, the agreed list of
"banking activities" in the Annex for which the single license is
valid ."
The list in the Annex sets forth the following banking ac-
tivities, which are "integral to banking" and for which, there-
fore, the single banking license is valid:
1. Deposit-taking and other forms of borrowing
2. Lending [including in particular: consumer credit, mort-
gage lending, factoring and invoice discounting, and trade
finance (including forfeiting)]
3. Financial leasing
4. Money transmission services
5. Issuing and administering means of payment (credit
cards, travellers cheques and bankers drafts)
6. Guarantees and commitments
7. Trading for own account or for account of the customers
in:
(a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs,
etc.)
(b) foreign exchange
(c) financial futures and options
(d) exchange and interest rate instruments
(e) securities
8. Participation in securities issues and the provision of
services related to such issues
9. Money broking
10. Portfolio management and advice
11. Safekeeping of securities
12. Credit reference services
13. Safe custody services. 49
The Annex encompasses all of the activities that currently,
in the opinion of the Commission, constitute the core of the
traditional banking services in the EEC.50 This list has been
drawn up on a liberal "universal banking" model. 51 From the
point of view of U.S. banks, the most important aspect of the
48. See id. art. 16, at 7.
49. Id. annex, at 10 (footnote omitted).
50. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at II.4(a).
51. The Annex does not distinguish between investment banking and commer-
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Annex is the inclusion of a broad range of transactions in se-
curities, specifically:
-trading for its own account or for account of customers
in all types of securities (whether corporate stocks or short
and long-term debt);
-participation in securities issues (underwriting) and the
provision of services related to such issues; and
-- portfolio management and advice.
52
The Commission recommends that the Annex be updated
under a flexible procedure so that it can respond to the devel-
opment of new banking services.53
It is, of course, possible that the banking license of a Mem-
ber State permits banking activities beyond the scope of the
Annex. In that case, the Host Member State is not required to
permit such activities.
C. Failure to Harmonize the Banking Powers in the Different
Member States
The Second Directive does not intend to harmonize the
scope of the banking licenses issued by the various Member
States (i.e., the powers of their banks), but leaves it to the
Home Member State to decide what banking activities a credit
institution is permitted to pursue under the banking license it
will issue. 54 It will be possible that the banking powers permit-
ted by the banking license of a Member State will fall short of
those powers set forth in the Annex. In that case, credit insti-
tutions from other Member States may provide services in a
Host Member State that credit institutions licensed by that
Host Member State are not permitted to provide. One might
expect that Member States that do not grant their credit insti-
tutions all the powers set forth in the Annex. will be exposed to
pressure from their banking industry to expand the permitted
banking powers to the fullest extent allowed by the Annex in
cial banking. Thus, it does not embrace the philosophy of the Glass-Steagall Act. See
infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
52. Second Directive, supra note 1, annex, at 10.
53. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at 11.4(a); see also Second Direc-
tive, supra note 1, art. 20(1), at 9. The Commission apparently wishes to avoid re-
peating the experience of U.S. banking law, which does not easily respond to chang-
ing market environments.
54. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 16, at 7.
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order to permit competitive equality. It can be expected that
all banking licenses of Member States will eventually cover all
of the banking powers set forth in the Annex. 55
A non-EEC credit institution that wishes to establish a
subsidiary credit institution in a Member State in order to ben-
efit from the principle of mutual recognition would be well ad-
vised to set up the subsidiary in a Member State that grants a
banking license permitting all (or most) of the activities listed
in the Annex. As soon as the Second Directive is imple-
mented, such a credit institution would enjoy a competitive ad-
vantage in the whole Community over credit institutions from
more restrictive Member States.
The Commission seems to assume that the remaining
legal differences among Member States (including taxation) af-
fecting the business environment of credit institutions will
eventually erode. EEC-wide competition will punish Member
States with undue restrictions, because they will lose banking
business to other more liberal Member States. The idea is that
competition, and not interference, will gradually create a uni-
fied market. 56
D. Establishment of Branches in a Host Member State
Under the Second Directive, the Host Member State will
no longer require any authorization for the establishment of
branches of credit institutions that are authorized in other
Member States.57 The Second Directive provides a procedure
for cooperation between Home Member State and Host Mem-
ber State authorities relating to the establishment of
branches. 58 A credit institution wishing to establish a branch
in another Member State must notify the authorities of its
Home Member State5 9 and provide certain specified informa-
tion (for example, program of operations, amount of own
funds and solvency ratio of the credit institution, address and
names of managers).6" The Home Member State must com-
municate the information to the Host Member State within
55. This is commonly referred to as "the race for the bottom."
56. See Superbank. A Survey, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1988, at 69.
57. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(1), at 3.
58. Id. art. 17, at 7-8.
59. Id. art. 17(1), at 7; see Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at II.4(c)l.
60. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 17(2), at 7.
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three months.61 , However, if after examining the notification
the competent authority of the Home Member State has rea-
son to doubt the adequacy of the organizational structure of
the credit institution, taking into account the envisioned opera-
tions, the Home Member State may refuse to send the informa-
tion to the prospective Host Member State authorities, but
only upon giving reasons therefor.62 This refusal is subject to
a right of appeal to the courts in the Home Member State.6"
JE. The Abolition of Initial Endowment Capital
The Second Directive abolishes the initial endowment
capital that is currently required by the majority of Member
States for the authorization of branches of credit institutions
already authorized in other Member States. 6' Such Member
States treat branches as if they were separate institutions. The
requirement of endowment capital is a barrier against the free-
dom of establishment of branches.
The Second Directive provides for a transitional rule,
which applies from January 1, 1990, until all requirements for
Host Member State authorization of branches of credit institu-
tions authorized in other Member States have been abolished.
During that period, the Host Member States may not require,
as a condition for authorization of a branch of an EEC credit
institution authorized in another Member State, an initial en-
dowment capital in excess of fifty percent of the minimum cap-
ital required by the Host Member State for authorization of
credit institutions of the same nature.65
IV. HOME COUNTRY AND HOST COUNTRY SUPERVISION
The guiding principle on which the Second Directive is
based is that of home country control:6 6 a credit institution
61. Id. art. 17(3), at 7.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(2), at 3-4; Explanatory Memorandum,
supra note 16, at 1.2(c).
65. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(2), at 3-4. rhe rule does not benefit
branches of non-EEC banks. Member States shall adopt the measures necessary to
comply with the provision of article 5(2) of the Second Directive by January 1, 1990.
Id. art. 22(2), at 9.
66. See id. seventh whereas clause, at 1; Explanatory Memorandum, supra note
16, at 1.2; White Paper, supra note 24, 103.
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will be supervised, even with regard to activities it provides on
a cross-border basis or through a branch in another Member
State, principally by the authorities of its Home Member
State.6 7
As a result of insufficient harmonization of liquidity stan-
dards and of insufficient coordination in the implementation of
monetary policy in the EEC, the Second Directive proposes
that, as an exception to the principle of home country control,
the Host Member State, pending further coordination, will re-
tain primary responsibility for the supervision of liquidity of
credit institutions and exclusive responsibility for the imple-
mentation of monetary policy.68 These measures, however,
must not embody discriminatory or restrictive treatment based
on the fact that a credit institution is authorized in another
Member State.69
The Second Directive also provides that until further co-
ordination, the authorities of the Host Member State in coop-
eration with the authorities of the Home Member State may
take the necessary measures to require credit institutions to
make sufficient provisions against the market risk incurred by
such institutions by virtue of operations in the securities mar-
kets in the Host Member State.71 In the opinion of the Com-
mission, this arrangement is necessary in the light of the events
of October 1987, and particularly because the proposal for a
directive on solvency ratios 7' will cover only credit risk (i.e., risk
attaching to the particular type of counterparty in receipt of,
67. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 19(1), at 8; see White Paper, supra note
24, at 28, 103; see also Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 11, at 5.
68. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 12(2), at 5.
69. Id.
70. Id. art. 12(3), at 5. For a discussion of the systematic or market risk, see
Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1171 (1988). U.S. commercial banks are not allowed to deal in
securities, thus U.S. banking law does not have comparable prudential standards with
respect to the market risk of securities. Examination and supervisory procedures
have been established to assure that international exchange risk is considered in eval-
uating the capital adequacy of banking institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 3903 (Supp. IV
1986). Provisions protecting against market risk are in the margin requirements for
broker/dealers, Regulation T under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 C.F.R.
pt. 220 (1988), and in the credit restrictions imposed upon banks that extend credit
for the purpose of buying or carrying margin stock if the credit is secured by margin
stock, Regulation U under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 C.F.R. pt. 221
(1988).
71. See supra note 20.
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for example, a bank loan or guarantee). 72 Securities transac-
tions (and most underwriting and dealing), however, involve
market or position risk (i.e., the risk of a general fall in the
market to which anyone who has taken an open position is ex-
posed), which is not intended to be covered by the solvency
ratio directive.73
V. WHAT IS A "CREDIT INSTITUTION" BENEFITING
FROM THE SECOND DIRECTIVE
A. Credit Institutions
A "credit institution" is defined as an "undertaking whose
business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from
"174the public and to grant credits for its own account ....
According to the Second Directive, credit institutions that are
authorized and supervised as credit institutions by the compe-
tent authorities of their Home Member States will benefit from
mutual, i.e., EEC-wide, recognition of their banking licenses
with respect to the activities enumerated in the Annex and for
which they are licensed in the Home Member State.75 This
means that the following entities do not benefit from mutual
recognition:
72. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at II.3(c).
73. Id.; see Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 12(3), at 5. The proposed sol-
vency ratio directive, see supra note 20, relates the credit institution's own funds (i.e.,
capital, which is the numerator of the ratio) to its total assets and off-balance sheet
liabilities (the denominator of the ratio). It establishes a uniform method of assess-
ing the ability of a credit institution to meet losses arising from the default of their
customers on the basis of risk weights for the components of the denominator. See
the Risk-Based Capital Guidelines for Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 54 Fed.
Reg. 4177 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A) (national banks), 54 Fed.
Reg. 4197 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. A (Regulation H)) (state
member banks), 54 Fed. Reg. 4209 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. A
(Regulation Y))(bank holding companies).
74. First Directive, supra note 5, art. 1, at 31. The Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956 (the "BHCA") defines "bank" in a similar fashion: "[a]n institution organ-
ized under the laws of the United States ... which both-(i) accepts demand deposits
or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by check or similar means for payment
to third parties or others; and (ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial
loans." BHCA, § 2(c), 12 U.S.C § 1841(c) (1982), as amended by the Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101(a)(1), 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 554-57. See the exclusions in article 2(2).of
the First Directive, supra note 5, at 31-32, as.amended by the Amending Directive,
supra note 30, at 15-16.
75. Second Directive, supra note 1, arts. 5(1), 16(1), at 3, 7.
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(i) entities that are not authorized and supervised as
credit institutions by a Member State, even though they
are engaged in some of the activities set forth in the An-
nex (for example, if a company engages only in financial
leasing and as such is not regulated by the Home Member
State as a credit institution, it is not a credit institution
under the Second Directive, although financial leasing is
an activity listed in the Annex);7 6
(ii) entities that do not engage in any of the activities in-
cluded in the Annex even though they are authorized and
supervised as credit institutions by a Member State.
An entity that has not been granted an authorization as a
credit institution by its Home Member State does not benefit
from mutual recognition under the Second Directive.77 Such
an entity can operate in a Host Member State only by virtue of
the general rules of the Treaty of Rome concerning the right of
establishment 78 and the free provision of services. 79 If the ac-
tivities of such an entity are subject to authorization in the
Host Member State, such authorization must be obtained. A
Host Member State cannot refuse to grant an authorization
where this would constitute discrimination based solely on na-
tionality."0
Branches in EEC countries of non-EEC credit institutions
do not benefit from the principle of mutual recognition, since
such non-EEC credit institution branches are not "credit insti-
tutions authorized in other Member States.' ' 1 On the other
hand, subsidiaries established in EEC countries by non-EEC
persons under a license for credit institutions are "credit insti-
tutions" benefiting from the principle of mutual recognition.
In other words, non-EEC ownership or control of a credit insti-
tution does not destroy the mutual recognition of the license
76. This is true even if the activity can be undertaken in the Home Member State
without prior authorization. Articles 5(1) and 16(1) of the Second Directive apply
only to "credit institutions." Id. arts. 5(1), 16(1), at 3, 7.
77. See id. arts. 2, 5(1), at 3. This is true even if the activity that the entity exer-
cises is included in the Annex and can be undertaken in the Home Member State
without any prior authorization.
78. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, arts. 52-58, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 23-25,
298 U.N.T.S. at 37-40.
79. Id. arts. 59-66, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 25-27, 298 U.N.T.S. at 40-42.
80. Id. art. 52, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 23, 298 U.N.T.S. at 37.
81. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(1), at 3; see id. art. 16(1), at 7.
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of the credit institution. Credit institution subsidiaries of non-
EEC banks that are already authorized to do business in a
Member State before the entry into force of the Second Direc-
tive would benefit from the rules of the Second Directive and
would not be subject to the new reciprocity requirements of
the Second Directive applicable to non-EEC entities establish-
ing a credit institution in a Member State.
2
B. Non-Credit Institution Subsidiaries of Credit Institutions
In some Member States credit institutions are not author-
ized to engage directly in some of the activities listed in the
Annex (for example, leasing, factoring, dealing in securities,
mortgage lending) but must conduct such activities through
subsidiaries.8 3 These subsidiaries do not qualify as credit insti-
tutions according to the First Directive84 and, as a result, they
would not benefit from mutual recognition under the Second
Directive. The Second Directive, however, permits such credit
institution subsidiaries to branch freely and to provide services
in the Member States, provided the following conditions are
met:8
5
(i) the activities of the subsidiary are fully consolidated
with those of the parent credit institution; 6
(ii) the parent is a credit institution authorized in the
Member State whose law governs the subsidiary and holds
ninety percent or more of the shares of the subsidiary;8 7
(iii) the parent credit institution accepts full responsibility
82. See infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
83. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at II.4(b).
84. For a definition of credit institutions, see supra note 30.
85. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(2), at 7. Subsidiaries of an EEC credit
institution meeting the conditions of article 16 of the Second Directive are called
"financial institutions conforming to the conditions laid down in Article 16(2)." Id.
86. Id. Article 16(2) of the Second Directive in accordance with the Directive on
Consolidated Supervision, supra note 45, requires that the subsidiary is effectively
included, in particular for the activities in question, in the consolidated supervision
of its parent credit institution notably for the calculation of the solvency ratio, for the
control of large exposures, and for the purposes of limiting participations in accord-
ance with article 10 of the Second Directive. Second Directive, supra note 1, art.
16(2), at 7.
87. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(2), at 7. Holding companies control-
ling the credit institution and the subsidiary would not be permissible. Article 16(2)
of the Second Directive permits the joint ownership of a subsidiary by several EEC
credit institutions. Id.
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for the subsidiary, i.e., it must guarantee the commitments
entered into by the subsidiary."8
The principle of Home Member State control and supervi-
sion applies to such subsidiaries."9 The extension of the rule
of mutual recognition to subsidiaries applies only to subsidiar-
ies of a credit institution authorized in a Member State. It does
not apply to U.S.-based or EEC-based non-bank subsidiaries of
a U.S. bank or a U.S. bank holding company. Such EEC-based
subsidiaries of a U.S. bank or bank holding company must be
authorized as credit institutions in a Member State in order to
benefit from the Second Directive.
VI. HARMONIZATION OF ESSENTIAL SUPERVISORY
STANDARDS
Although the Second Directive does not provide for a uni-
form banking license for all Member States, the Commission is
of the view that the concept of home country control requires a
harmonization of essential supervisory standards."0 The stan-
dards to be harmonized in the Second Directive are
(1) minimum capital for authorization 9' and continuing
business; 92
(2) supervisory control of major shareholders 93 and of
banks' participations in the non-bank sector;9 4 and
(3) sound accounting and control mechanisms.95
The provisions for mutual recognition and home country
control in articles 16 through 19 will take effect at a date prior
to the ultimate deadline of January 1, 1993, only if Member
State legislation is in place on own funds and on harmonized
88. Compare id. with § 23A & 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371(c)
(1982), as amended by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-86, § 102(a), 1987' U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 564-65,
which severely restrict all transactions (including guarantees) by member banks and
their affiliates. Section 23A applies to FDIC insured banks by virtue of § 18(j) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 18280) (1982), amended by Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, §§ 102(b), 103(a), 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 566-67.
89. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(2), at 7.
90. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at 1.6.
91. Second Directive, supra note 1, arts. 3, 8, at 3, 4.
92. Id. art. 8, at 4.
93. Id. art. 9, at 4-5.
94. Id. art. 10, at 5.
95. Id. art. 11, at 5.
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solvency ratios.9 6
A. Minimum Capital for Authorization and Continuing Business
The First Directive stipulates that a credit institution
should possess "adequate minimum own funds" when starting
its business. 97 The Second Directive introduces the require-
ment that a credit institution may only be authorized if ithas
an initial capital of at least five million ECU.98 Each Member
State is free, however, to apply higher levels for its own credit
institutions.9 9 In addition, the Second Directive endorses the
principle of prudential supervision, by stipulating that a credit
institution's own funds must not fall below the initial capital
required for its authorization.100
B. Control of Major Shareholders
As in the United States, the ownership and control Of a
credit institution by non-banking interests is an issue of con-
cern for the Community because of the risks of cross-financing
and conflicts of interest. For this reason the Second Directive
stipulates that the supervisory authorities of the Home Mem-
ber State, before granting an authorization to a credit institu-
tion, must be informed of the identity of shareholders and
members holding a qualified participation in the proposed
credit institution as well as of the amount of such participa-
tions.' 0 1 For purposes of the Second Directive, a "qualified
participation" is defined as "a holding, direct or indirect, in an
undertaking which represents 10% or more of the capital or of
the voting rights or which enables the exercise of a significant
96. Id. art. 22, at 9; see Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at 1.6.
97. First Directive, supra note 5, art. 3(2), at 33. "Own funds" is defined in arti-
cle 1 of the First Directive as "the credit institution's own capital, including items
which may be treated as capital under national rules." Id. at 31; see supra note 18.
98. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 3, at 3.
99. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at II.2(a). In the United States, an
extensive web of statutory and regulatory provisions is intended to ensure safety and
soundness of banks, for instance, by imposing capital adequacy standards, prudential
standards, lending limits, restrictions on loans to affiliates, restraints on the issue of
guarantees, and restraints on leasing activities.
100. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 8(1), at 4; see Explanatory Memoran-
dum, supra note 16, at 1.3.
101. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 4, at 3.
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influence .... 12 This provision applies to direct or indirect
shareholders and members.' 0 3 The competent authorities are
directed to "appraise the suitability" of the shareholders and
members'0 4 and possibly to reject any particular shareholder
structure as improper when the institution is being formed.' 0 5
The Second Directive also requires prior notification to
the competent authorities of the Member State of a proposed
direct or indirect acquisition of a qualified participation in a
credit institution that is already in operation'0 6 and of a pro-
posed increase of a qualified participation that would result in
the credit institution becoming a subsidiary.' 07 This provision
enables the supervisory authorities to assess, and as they see fit
to reject, any inappropriate group structure that could be det-
rimental to safe and sound banking management.'10  The noti-
fication obligation is imposed first upon the prospective share-
holders or members who are considering the acquisition, di-
rectly or indirectly, of, or an increase in, a qualified
participation in a credit institution. 10 9 In addition, the credit
institution itself must each year furnish to the competent au-
thorities of its Home Member State the names of major share-
holders and members and the size of their qualified participa-
tions.'' 0
Whenever shareholders or members holding qualified
102. Id. art. 1, at 3. The term "significant influence" is defined in article 33 of
the Seventh Council Directive of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54(3)(g) of the
Treaty on Consolidated Accounts (83/349/EEC), O.J. L 193/1, at 10 (1983) [herein-
after Seventh Council Directive] as presumed to be existing when an undertaking
"has 20% or more of the shareholders' or members' voting rights in [another] un-
dertaking."
103. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 4, at 3. Article 4 applies to physical and
legal persons who are shareholders or members. Id.
104. Id.
105. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at 11.2(b).
106. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(1), at 4.
107. Id. "Subsidiary" is defined in article 1 of the Second Directive by reference
to article 1 of the Seventh Council Directive, supra note 102, at 2, as an undertaking
in which a parent undertaking has a majority of the shareholders' or members' voting
rights, or has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the administrative, man-
agement, or supervisory body and is at the same time a shareholder, or that can be
controlled by the parent undertaking by means of other arrangements or rights. Sec-
ond Directive, supra note 1, art. 1, at 3.
108. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at I1.3(a).
109. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(1), at 4.
110. Id. art. 9(2), at 4.
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participations in a credit institution exercise their influence in
a way that is likely to be detrimental to prudent and sound
management of the banking activities of the credit institution,
the competent authorities of the Member State may take "ap-
propriate measures to bring such a situation to an end.""'
Such measures may consist, in particular, of injunctions, sanc-
tions against directors and managers, or the suspension of the
voting rights of the shares held by the shareholders or mem-
bers in question.'12 The Second Directive does not specify
under what conditions a Member State may take such serious
measures.
C. Non-Financial Subsidiaries
The participations of credit institutions in other credit or
financial institutions is governed by the Directive on Consoli-
dated Supervision. 1 3 The Second Directive contains, how-
ever, provisions on the participation by credit institutions in
non-credit and non-financial institutions.' 14 These investments
require particular attention, because they may affect the finan-
cial stability of the investing credit institution.' ' 5 Participa-
tions in a subsidiary may affect the soundness of the credit in-
stitution if the former runs into financial difficulties (contagion
risk) and equity participations constitute a long-term freezing
of the assets of the investing credit institution.' 1 6
The Second Directive harmonizes differing standards of
the Member States regarding equity participation of credit in-
111. Id. art. 9(3), at 4-5.
112. Id.
113. Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 86. The Directive on
Consolidated Supervision provides that if more than 25% of the capital of a credit
institution or financial institution is owned by another credit institution, it will be
supervised on a consolidated basis by the competent authorities of the Home Mem-
ber State of the parent credit institution. Id. arts. 1, 3(3), at 19. "Financial institu-
tion" is defined in article 1 of the Directive on Consolidated Supervision as "an un-
dertaking, not being a credit institution, whose principal activity is to grant credit
facilities (including guarantees), to acquire participations or to make investments."
Id. art. 1, at 19. This definition applies to the Second Directive by virtue of article 1
of the Second Directive. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 1, at 3. Although it is
not entirely clear from this definition what kind of activities are encompassed, the
term is broader than the term "bank" as defined in § 2(c) of the BHCA. See supra
note 74; see also infra note 117.
114. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 10, at 5.
115. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at II.'(b).
116. Id.
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stitutions by limiting credit institutions in the following two re-
spects: if they wish to acquire or maintain participations in
non-credit or non-financial institutions,
(i) a credit institution may not hold a qualified (ten per-
cent or more) participation of an amount greater than ten
percent of its own funds (i.e., its capital) in a company that
is neither a credit institution nor a financial institution;' 17
and (ii) the total value of such qualified participations may
not exceed fifty percent of own funds (i.e., the capital) of
the credit institution.118
These limits do not apply in the case of shares held (i)
temporarily during a financial rescue or restructuring opera-
tion, (ii) during the normal course of the underwriting process,
or (iii) in the institution's own name but on behalf of others. 119
If the limits are exceeded, in exceptional circumstances the su-
pervisory authorities of the Home Member State must require
the credit institution either to increase its capital or to take
other remedial measures. 20  The authorities of the Home
Member State need not apply these limits if they require that
117. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(1), at 5. For the definition of"quali-
fled participation," see supra note 102- and accompanying text. "Financial institu-
tion" is defined in article 1 of the Directive on Consolidation Supervision as "an
undertaking, not being a credit institution, whose principal activity is to grant credit
facilities (including guarantees) to acquire participations or to make investments."
Directive on Consolidation Supervision, supra note 86, art. 1, at 19; see supra note 113.
The limits do not apply to qualified participation in undertakings the activities of
which are a direct extension of banking or concern services ancillary to banking, such
as leasing, factoring, the management of unit trusts, the management of data
processing services, or any other similar activity. Compare article 43(2)(f) of the Coun-
cil Directive of 8 December 1986 on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Ac-
counts of Banks and Other Financial Institutions, O.J. L 372/1 (1986), applicable by
virtue of article 10(1) of the Second Directive, supra note 1, at 5 with BHCA, § 4(c)(6),
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1982), pursuant to which U.S. bank holding companies may
not control more than five percent of any class of voting stock of a company engaged
in non-banking activities and BHCA, § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982), amended
by Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 502(h)(2), 1987
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 628-29, pursuant to which U.S.
bank holding companies may own 100% of subsidiaries engaged in activities closely
related to banking.
118. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(2), at 5. For the definition of"finan-
cial institution" see supra note 117.
119. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(3), at 5. This provision can be com-
pared with the exception for the acquisition of shares for "a debt previously con-
tracted" under § 4(c)(2) of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(2) (1982). For the com-
parable underwriting exception, see Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.124(d) (1988).
120. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(4), at 5.
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the qualified participations in question be deducted when cal-
culating the capital of the relevant credit institutions.'
2
'
VII. IMPACT ON NON-EEC CREDIT INSTITUTIONS:
RECIPROCITY
e Subsidiaries of non-EEC entities established in any Mem-
ber State that are authorized as credit institutions by such
Member State may benefit in the same way as other EEC credit
institutions from mutual recognition of their license, i.e., they
have the right to establish branches and to provide services
throughout the EEC. 1 22 Thus, a non-EEC entity can only ben-
efit from the principles of the Second Directive if it has a credit
institution subsidiary authorized in a Member State, 23 while
branches of non-EEC banks in the EEC do not have the benefit
of these rights. 24 As discussed above, the First Directive con-
tains certain provisions applicable to the authorization of
branches of non-EEC banks. 1
25
For the establishment of a credit institution subsidiary or
the acquisition of a participation in an EEC credit institution
by a non-EEC bank, the Second Directive establishes a require-
ment of reciprocity. 26 This reciprocity is an EEC-wide reci-
procity, i.e., credit institutions from all Member States must
enjoy reciprocal treatment in the country of the applying non-
EEC bank. 27 Reciprocity is enforced by means of an advance
consultation procedure with the Commission that is initiated
by the Member State in which the non-EEC person desires to
establish a subsidiary credit institution or to acquire a partici-
pation in a credit institution. 28 The Member State must in-
form the other Member States and the Commission of such
request. 129
Within three months, the Commission shall examine
121. Id. art. 10(6), at 5.
122. Id. arts. 5(1), 16(1), at 3, 7.
123. See id.
124. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
125. Id. Pursuant to article 9 of the First Directive, authorization of an EEC
branch of a foreign bank does not require reciprocal treatment by the foreign coun-
try. First Directive, supra note 5, art. 9, at 35.
126. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 7, at 4.
127. Id. art. 7(5), at 4.
128. Id. art. 7(2)-(7), at 4.
129. Id. art. 7(2), at 4.
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"whether all credit institutions of the Community enjoy recip-
rocal treatment, in particular regarding the establishment of
subsidiaries or the acquisition of participations in credit insti-
tutions in the third country in question."' 3 0 If the Commission
finds that reciprocity is not ensured in the country of the non-
EEC person, it may suspend the decision of the Member State
to permit the de novo formation or acquisition.131
VIII. THE RECIPROCITY DISCUSSION WITH RESPECT TO
THE UNITED STATES
It is not possible to predict how narrowly or broadly the
reciprocity requirement, as it is currently contained in the draft
of the Second Directive, will be construed. It is generally rec-
ognized that the United States does not discriminate against
foreign credit institutions and, indeed, the International Bank-
ing Act of 1978 is founded ,on the principle of "national treat-
ment."'' 3 2 U.S. banks are subject to even more stringent limi-
tations than foreign banks with respect to their ability to en-
gage in non-banking activities. 1 3  If reciprocity means
130. Id. art. 7(5), at 4.
131. Id. art. 7(6), at 4.
132. See supra note 39. There are, however, some discriminatory barriers against
foreign banks in the U.S. See International Banking Act of 1978, § 4, 12 U.S.C.
§ 3102(a) (1982) (foreign bank may establish Federal branch or agency in any State
only if establishment of branch or agency by foreign bank is not prohibited by State
law); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: COMPETITIVE
CONCERNS OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL FIRMS IN JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE
UNITED STATES 21-25 (1988) (discussing exceptions to the rule of national treatment
of foreign banks, including among others: the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 3501, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(102 Stat.) 1107, 1386 (Primary Dealers Act of 1988), restrictions by state insurance
regulations on issuance by foreign banks of reinsurance standby letters of credit, and
limitations on access to the Fed-wire Overdraft Capacity); U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, 4
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES app. F-31 (1976) (Foreign Bank-
ing in the United States); New York State Bar Ass'n, Int'l Law and Practice Section,
Comm. on Int'l Banking, Sec., and Fin. Transactions, Report on Issuance of Securities by
Foreign Banks and Their Finance Subsidiaries Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and
Rule 6c-9 (E.T. Patrikis, Chairman, and E. Gewirtz and M. Gruson, Reporters) to be
published in 1989 INT'L L. PRACTICUM - (treatment of foreign banks as investment
companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940); Feinman, National Treatment
of Foreign Banks Operating in the United States: The International Banking Act of 1978, 11 L.
& PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1109 (1979); Glidden & Shockey, U.S. Branches and Agencies of For-
eign Banks: A Comparison of the Federal and State Chartering Options, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 65,
73-76.
133. See BHCA, § 2(h), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(h) (1982), as amended by the Compet-
itive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 205, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG.
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"absence of discrimination," reciprocity exists between the
United States and the EEC. However, if the EEC intends to
apply a kind of "mirror-image" reciprocity requirement,
1 34
under which a foreign credit institution's access to a country's
financial markets is conditioned on that country's own credit
institutions receiving privileges in the foreign market identical
to those in the home market, then difficult questions arise.
The following text analyzes whether the rights granted to EEC
credit institutions in the United States are identical to those
granted to U.S. credit institutions in the EEC.
A. Reciprocity with Respect to Establishment and Acquisition
The Second Directive requires that reciprocal treatment
be accorded by the country of a non-EEC person desiring to
establish a subsidiary credit institution or to acquire a partici-
pation in a credit institution. Such reciprocity shall be ac-
corded by the foreign country "in particular regarding the estab-
lishment of subsidiaries or the acquisition of participations in credit
institutions .... ."' The United States has a unique dual
banking system that leaves foreign banks the choice to obtain a
license either under the law of a particular state or under fed-
eral law. Since the requirements for establishing and operat-
ing banks are different under federal law and under the law of
each state, a "mirror-image" reciprocity test would have to
look to the jurisdiction in the United States in which the insti-
tution seeking authorization in the EEC is chartered. This
means that in the case of a state-chartered bank seeking en-
trance into the EEC, the Commission can only conclude that
reciprocal treatment is or is not ensured by the laws of the par-
ticular state or, in case of a national bank seeking entrance into
the EEC, under federal banking law. The situation is even
& ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 584-85; International Banking Act of 1978, § 8, 12
U.S.C. § 3106 (1982), amended by Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-86, § 204, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 584; Reg-
ulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.23(f)(5)(iii) (1988). See generally Gruson & Weld, Nonbank-
ing Activities of Foreign Banks Operating in the United States, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 129.
134. See Letter from the International Capital Markets Advisory Committee of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to E. Gerald Corrigan 2 (Nov. 28, 1988) (pro-
posing general principles to be taken into account to ensure fair and open access to
financial markets) (available at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
135. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(5), at 4 (emphasis added).
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more complicated because state-chartered banks are also sub-
ject to supervision by federal agencies.
Before it is possible to determine whether the United
States or any particular state of the United States offers recip-
rocal treatment in the areas of establishment and acquisition to
EEC credit institutions, it is necessary to assess how the EEC
treats U.S. credit institutions seeking entry into the EEC bank-
ing market. Such treatment differs from Member State to
Member State. As stated above, the authorization for the es-
tablishment of a credit institution or the acquisition of a credit
institution remains in the jurisdiction of the competent author-
ities of the particular Member State in which the credit institu-
tion is or is to be located.' 36 The Second Directive neither
centralizes nor harmonizes the conditions and requirements
for the establishment or acquisition of credit institutions by
non-EEC entities."i 7 The Second Directive merely decrees
that such authorization by the competent authorities of a Mem-
ber State should be suspended if the Commission finds that
reciprocity is not ensured. 138 Since the laws and regulations
relating to establishment and acquisition in the different Mem-
ber States vary, it is not feasible to determine on a "mirror-
image" basis whether "all credit institutions of the Community
enjoy reciprocal treatment"'' 39 in the United States with re-
spect to establishment and acquisition. A comparison of the rights
of establishment and acquisition would be possible on a "one-
on-one" basis comparing one Member State at a time with the
United States or the one state of the United States in which the
U.S. credit institution is located. If the law of the United States
or the relevant state of the United States must be reciprocal
with the laws of each Member State, U.S. law must give credit
institutions from all Member States the same treatment that
the Member State with the most "liberal" rules gives to U.S.
credit institutions, and the United States must disregard non-
reciprocal or discriminatory rules of other Member States.
While a "mirror-image" analysis of reciprocity leads to strange
results, it is quite possible, however, to determine whether the
136. See id. arts. 3, 7, at 3, 4; First Directive, supra note 5, art. 3, at 33-34.
137. Contra First Directive, supra note 5, art. 3, at 33-34, which sets forth certain
minimum requirements for the authorization of credit institutions.
138. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(6), at 4.
139. Id. art. 7(5), at 4.
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United States or a particular state of the United States discrimi-
nates against banks of all Member States or any particular Mem-
ber State.
B. Reciprocity with Respect to Banking Powers
The Commission in its reciprocity examination pursuant
to article 7(5) of the Second Directive is not limited to estab-
lishment and acquisition. The Commission may also question
whether reciprocal treatment regarding the subsequent opera-
tion and the powers of banks in general is ensured in the non-
EEC country in question.
Since the powers of U.S. state-chartered banks and state-
chartered branches of foreign banks vary from state to state
and are not determined by federal law, reciprocal treatment of
EEC credit institutions seeking to establish a state-chartered
bank in the United States can only be examined with respect to
each particular state. Reciprocal treatment of EEC credit insti-
tutions seeking to establish a national bank can only be ex-
amined with respect to federal law.
The same is true for the EEC. As discussed above, even
after the Second Directive has been implemented, the powers
of credit institutions will be determined by the authorizing
Member State.'40 Accordingly, reciprocity with respect to
banking power can be judged only with respect to the banking
law of the particular Member State in which a foreign bank
seeks authorization for the establishment of a credit institution
subsidiary. A reciprocity investigation on an "EEC-wide" basis
would lead to absurd results. If a U.S. bank attempts to estab-
lish or to acquire a subsidiary in a Member State that does not
grant its banks insurance powers, should the Commission deny
reciprocity and reject the U.S. bank because another Member
State grants its banks such powers when the United States does
not? (Insurance powers are not listed in the Annex.)
Even a comparison of the core banking activities set forth
in the Annex with the powers granted to national banks in the
United States by federal law or to the powers granted to a state
bank by state law is not helpful for the reciprocity discus-
sion."' If an EEC credit institution desires to engage in an
140. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
141. 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 24(Seventh) sets
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activity listed in the Annex, it is not allowed to do so unless it is
authorized to conduct such activity by its Home Member
State. 142 The Second Directive does not define the powers of
EEC credit institutions; its purpose is merely to define the
scope of mutual recognition. 43 If a U.S. bank attempts to es-
tablish or to acquire a credit institution subsidiary in a Member
State that does not permit its banks to underwrite corporate
equity or debt securities or to deal in securities, although these
powers are listed in the Annex, should the Commission deny
reciprocity because the Member State could grant its banks
these powers and other Member States have done so? It is
difficult to see what purpose an exclusion of the U.S. bank
would serve, because once licensed in that Member State, the
credit institution could not exercise underwriting or dealing
powers on an EEC-wide basis.
If a U.S. bank, however, attempts to set up or acquire a
credit institution subsidiary in a Member State that permits its
banks to underwrite corporate equity and debt securities or to
deal in securities, the Commission might well reach the conclu-
sion that reciprocity does not exist, because a bank from that
Member State could not engage in such activities in the United
States if it has a deposit-taking facility in the United States.
This result is mandated by the Glass-Steagall Act, which has
become a focal point of the reciprocity discussion.
In a nutshell, the Glass-Steagall Act was designed to sepa-
rate commercial from investment banking. It accomplishes
this by, among other things, prohibiting banks from underwrit-
ing or dealing in corporate debt or equity securities and from
being affiliated with companies engaged in such activities. 144
forth the powers of national banks. Id. The powers of state banks are set forth in the
relevant state banking laws. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 96-98 (McKinney 1971 &
Supp. 1989); see also BHCA, § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982), amended by Com-
petitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 502(h)(2), 1987 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 522, 628-29, and Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.25 (1988) (setting forth activities in which non-banking subsidiaries of bank
holding companies may engage).
142. See supra note 44 and accompanying. text.
143. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(1), at 7.
144. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) (national banks), applies to federal branches and agencies of foreign
banks by virtue of § 4(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C.
§ 3102(b) (1982), and to state branches and agencies by virtue of § 7(b)(2) of the
International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3105(b)(2) (1982); see also § 9(20) of
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Recently the Federal Reserve Board has permitted bank affili-
ates to engage in underwriting and dealing activities with re-
spect to certain limited types of securities, if such activities are
limited to less than five percent of such affiliate's gross reve-
nues. 145 Brokerage and investment advisory activities are per-
mitted for banks and bank affiliates. 146
An analysis of whether an EEC credit institution would be
permitted in the United States to engage in each one of the
activities listed in the Annex (other than underwriting and
dealing) is beyond the scope of this Article. The Annex de-
scribes the activities in all-encompassing terms. In each case it
would be necessary to determine the exact scope of the activity
listed in the Annex. For purposes of finding reciprocity, it
should not matter whether an EEC credit institution could en-
gage in the same activities in the United States through a U.S.
banking subsidiary or through a non-bank subsidiary of a bank
holding company. A finding of reciprocity with respect to each
of the activities in the Annex would also require a determina-
tion of just how closely the ability to engage in the activity in
the United States must "mirror-image" the ability to engage in
the same activity in a Member State. Contrary to the broad-
brush approach taken by the Annex, the U.S. regulators have
excelled in delineating the scope and conditioning the exercise
of permitted banking activities and of activities closely related
the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982); Glass-Steagall Act, § 21, 12 U.S.C.
§ 378 (1982) (non-member banks).
145. The Federal Reserve Board has determined that if such activities amount to
less than five percent of the gross revenues of the bank affiliate over a two year pe-
riod, the bank affiliate would not be "engaged principally" in underwriting or dealing
and would not violate § 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982), which
prohibits bank affiliation with securities organizations. See First Chicago, 74 Fed.
Res. Bull. 706 (1988); Bank of Boston, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 699 (1988); Bank of New
England, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 133 (1988); Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co., Bankers Trust
N.Y., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987), aft'd, Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Gov-
ernors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2830 (1988); Marine Midland
Banks, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 738 (1987); Chemical N.Y., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 731 (1987);
Security Pacific, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 622 (1987.); Manufacturers Hanover, 73 Fed. Res.
Bull. 620 (1987); Chase Manhattan, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 367 (1987).
146. See Bankers Trust N.Y., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 695 (1988); Manufacturers Han-
over, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 930 (1987); J.P. Morgan and Co., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 810
(1987); National Westminster Bank, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584 (1986), aff'd, Securities
Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 697 (1988). See generally M. CAPATIDES, A GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL MARKET Ac-
TIVITIES OF BANKS AND BANK HOLDING COMPANIES § V (1988).
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to banking. A very narrow understanding of reciprocity could
deny reciprocity because of the difference between these two
approaches. With certain restrictions, U.S. banks generally
have the power to exercise, either directly or through bank
holding company affiliates, the powers listed in the Annex
(other than underwriting of and dealing in securities).
C. Reciprocity with Respect to EEC- Wide Rights:
EEC- Wide Banking
Only to the extent that the Second Directive grants EEC-
wide rights to, or imposes EEC-wide restrictions on, credit in-
stitutions authorized in a Member State, can reciprocal treat-
ment be judged against EEC-wide standards. Those standards
are mainly the following two: first, the right to establish
branches in all Member States' 47 and second, the restriction
against acquiring companies engaged in non-banking activi-
ties. 148
If the right to freely establish branches throughout the
EEC granted by the Second Directive to EEC credit institu-
tions '49 is measured against the restrictions on interstate bank-
ing prevailing in the United States, then the U.S. law seems to
be more restrictive. State-chartered banks, for example, may
establish branches only in states that will accept such branches.
As barely any states accept the branches of banks chartered in
other states,150 interstate branching is effectively prohibited.
Of course, this situation may change, but only on a state-by-
state (and most likely regional) basis. Currently, however,
although a chartering state may permit a bank to branch
outside the state, 151 interstate branching does not exist.
Similarly, the McFadden Act permits a national bank to
operate branches only within its home state and only to the
extent that a bank of the same state is permitted to operate
147. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(1), at 3.
148. Id. art. 10, at 5; see supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
149. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(1), at 3.
150. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts permits banks organized in any of
the states of Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or Vermont to
branch in the Commonwealth if such other state permits Massachusetts-chartered
banks to branch in its state. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 167, § 39 (1987 & Supp. 1988).
151. New York, for example, permits New York State-chartered banks to estab-
lish branches in other states and foreign countries. N.Y. BANKING LAw § 105(3) (Mc-
Kinney 1971 & Supp. 1989).
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branches under state law.' 52 Therefore, although a state may
allow out-of-state national banks to operate a branch in its
state, the McFadden Act would prohibit the national bank from
doing so. The McFadden Act does not, however, prohibit na-
tional banks from engaging in non-core banking activities
outside their home state. 153 Receiving deposits, paying checks,
and lending money are core banking activities. 54 A national
bank may, therefore, engage in many activities outside its
home state, subject, of course, to federal and state regulation
of the non-banking activity (for example, securities laws).
A foreign bank that operates a deposit-taking federal or
state branch in a particular state, its "home state," is prohib-
ited by section 5 of the International Banking Act of 1978'15
from opening a deposit-taking branch in any other state. How-
ever, since EEC law does not require reciprocal treatment for
the establishment of Community branches of foreign credit in-
stitutions, 5 6 the U.S. interstate branching restrictions on for-
eign banks may be of less relevance for the reciprocity discus-
sion.
The so-called Douglas Amendment, section 3(d) of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, prohibits a bank holding
company or any of its subsidiaries from acquiring, directly or
indirectly, any interest in a bank chartered by a state other than
the holding company's home state, unless specifically author-
ized by the statutory laws of the state in which the target is
located. 57 The statutory laws of an ever-increasing number of
states specifically authorize such acquisitions. At present, the
.statutes of all but five states permit interstate acquisitions, but
the requirements of each vary widely.15 8 In an effort to allow
152. McFadden Act, §§ 7(c), 8, 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 81 (1982).
153. See Clark v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (since discount
securities brokerage is not a core banking function, office of a national bank at which
such activities were conducted was not "branch" within the meaning of 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(f) (1982) and, therefore, not subject to home-state branch limitations of McFad-
den Act). National banks may have loan production offices anywhere in the country,
as such offices "originate" but do not make loans. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.7380 (1988).
154. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.7380 (1988).
155. 12 U.S.C. § 3103 (1982).
156. See supra note 16.
157. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
158. See generally Bogaard, Bank Expansion in the Western United States Interstate Com-
pact, in BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 1988, at 511 (P.L.I. 1988) [hereinafter BANK-
ING LAW AND REGULATION]; Mutterperl, Current Issues in Interstate Banking: Regionalism
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bank expansion free of competition from the money center
banks of New York, these statutes started by lifting the ban on
interstate acquisitions within their geographic regions only.' 59
This area of law is evolving rapidly. The Second Directive
does not authorize EEC credit institutions to acquire a credit
institution in another Member State by virtue of its authoriza-
tion in the Home Member State. However, particular Member
States may permit EEC credit institutions as well as their hold-
ing companies to acquire credit institutions in several Member
States.
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 does not restrict
bank holding companies from acquiring interests in companies
located in other states if the acquiree is engaged in activities
that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has
found to be closely related to banking and a proper incident
thereto.160 The state in which the non-banking subsidiary is
established, however, may regulate this indirect activity by an
out-of-state bank holding company with its banking laws.' 6'
Many of the activities listed in the Annex are activities that the
Board of Governors has found to be closely related to banking.
D. Reciprocity with Respect to EEC- Wide Rights: Investment in
Non-Bank Subsidiaries
With respect to investments in non-bank subsidiaries, the
situation in the United States is as follows: national banks and
state member banks are not permitted to purchase any shares
of stock and are, therefore, not authorized to establish a sub-
sidiary. 162 The rules pertaining to state banks vary from state
Versus Nationalism, in BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, supra, at 499; Prochnow, Geo-
graphic Expansion: Traditional and Nontraditional, in BANKING LAW AND REGULATION,
supra, at 505; Smith, Geographic Expansion: Traditional and Nontraditional Banking, in
BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, supra, at 375.
159. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159 (1985)
(states- may lift the bank holding company's prohibition against out-of-state bank ac-
quisitions according to the discretion of the state legislatures); Brainerd, Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors: Green Light for Regional Interstate Banking, 35 AM.
U.L. REV. 387 (1986).
160. See BHCA, § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982), amended by Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 502(h)(2), 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 628-29; Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225
(1988).
161. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-5a(d) (1987 & Supp. 1988).
162. 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (national banks). State
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to state.163 Banks, even if prohibited from owning subsidiaries,
may be affiliated with other banks or companies engaged in
activities closely related to banking through a holding com-
pany. Bank holding companies, 164 however, are prohibited
from acquiring and retaining direct or indirect ownership or
control of any voting shares of any company that is not a bank,
a bank holding company, or an exempted subsidiary.1 65 The
most important example of an exempted subsidiary is a com-
pany the activities of which the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System has determined to be so closely related to
banking as to be a proper incident thereto. 166 Another very
important exemption from the prohibition against investing in
non-banks allows bank holding companies to acquire and own
not more than 5% of the outstanding voting shares of any non-
bank if the bank holding company does not control that com-
pany. 167 This exemption does not limit the investment by a
bank holding company in shares of a non-bank to a certain per-
centage of the capital of the bank or of the bank holding com-
pany.
By comparison, EEC credit institutions are allowed to
make direct investments in companies that are neither credit
institutions nor financial institutions. 68
In case the credit institution acquires or holds ten percent
member banks are subject to the same restrictions on investment as national banks.
12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982); see Gruson, Investment in Foreign Equity Securities and Debt-Equity
Conversion by U.S. Banks, Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Bank Holding Companies,
1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. _.
163. See, e.g., CAL. FINANCIAL CODE § 761 (West 1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§§ 761, 767 (1985 & Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.67 (West 1984 & Supp.
1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.803 (WEST 1970 & Supi'. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17:9A-24, 17:9A-24.9, 17:9A-25, 17:9A-25.5 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 97 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1989); see Gruson, supra note 162, at _.
164. For the definition of "bank holding company" see BHCA, § 2(a)(1), 12
U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982).
165. BHCA, § 4(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1982), amended by Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101(b), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 552, 557; see Gruson & Weld, supra note 133, at 136.
166. BHCA, § 4(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1982), amended by Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 502(h)(2), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 628-29.
167. BHCA, § 4(c)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1982); see Gruson, supra note 162,
at _; Gruson & Weld, supra note 133, at 131-33.
168. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(1), at 5. For the definition of"finan-
cial institution," see supra note 117.
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or more of the capital or voting shares of a non-credit and non-
financial institution, or otherwise is able to exercise a signifi-
cant influence in that institution, 169 such investment is limited
to 10% of the credit institution's own funds. 170 All such quali-
fied participations together held by one credit institution may
not exceed 50% of the credit institution's own funds.' 7'
Whereas U.S. bank holding companies are permitted to
have non-controlling interests of up to 5% of the voting shares
in a non-bank irrespective of the size of such non-bank, EEC
credit institutions may hold up to 100% of the voting shares of
a non-bank, if such investment does not exceed 10% of the
credit institution's capital and all such investments together do
not exceed 50% of the credit institution's capital. It is not pos-
sible to determine which approach constitutes the more re-
strictive treatment. It all depends on whether a bank prefers to
make a small investment in a larger company or a larger invest-
ment in a smaller company. The underlying policy of both ap-
proaches is to ensure the soundness of the investing bank. It is
difficult to see why the differences in the non-banking restric-
tion under the two systems should give rise to an argument
that reciprocal treatment is not ensured.
Since only a few supervisory standards will be harmonized
pursuant to the Second Directive,17 2 it appears difficult to see
how the Commission can apply a "mirror-image," EEC-wide
reciprocity analysis to supervisory standards before allowing
U.S. banks to establish credit institutions in the EEC.
E. Purpose of the Reciprocity Requirement
It is widely believed that the EEC's intention in requiring
reciprocity is principally to protect EEC banks from being de-
nied access to foreign markets in a discriminatory manner.17 3
The European Community Commissioner for External Rela-
169. This would be a "qualified participation." Second Directive, supra note 1,
art. 1, at 3; see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
170. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(1), at 5; see supra note 117 and ac-
companying text.
171. Second Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(2), at 5; see supra note 118 and ac-
companying text.
172. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., EC Single Market Plan Will Bring Partnership, Not a Fortress, Commission
Paper Declares: Foreign Bank Eligibility Questioned, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1416, 1417
(Oct. 26, 1988).
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tions, Willy De Clereq, seemed to. support that view when he
said, "We are not going to say the United States has to change
its banking law. We are not interested in legal equivalence.
We are interested in economic equivalence."' 17 4
Further clarifying his position, De Clereq said that he 'Was
concerned about restrictions on European banking activities in
Japan and that the Second Directive is aimed against protec-
tionist measures such as they are currently applied byJapan. 175
In connection with his demand for economic equivalence he
stressed that the market share of the Japanese banks in the
EEC is ten percent, while the EEC banks have less than a one
percent market share in Japan. 76 Mr. De Clereq's statement
should give little comfort to U.S. banks: the reciprocity re-
quirements of the Second Directive clearly apply to all coun-
tries, including the United States. U.S. bankers and regulators
might well reread Brothers Grimm's tale about the club in the
bag. 177 It is not yet certain whether the reciprocity require-
ment will be enacted. Members of the U.S. Congress and also
interested parties within the EEC (mainly in the United King-
dom and Germany) have argued that the reciprocity require-
ment should be replaced by a requirement of national treat-
ment. The national treatment requirement generally has the
advantage that it is an effective protection against protectionist
and discriminatory measures of other countries, while it re-
spects a legitimate degree of national discretion in the regula-
tory policy. It is a great pity that the United States set a very
unfortunate precedent by enacting a reciprocity requirement
in the Primary Dealers Act of 1988.178
CONCLUSION
It is not clear whether the EEC will wind up with a reci-
procity requirement in the Second Directive for the establish-
ment or acquisition of a credit institution by non-EEC institu-
174. Commerce Official Warns of Protectionist Potential in EC's Plan for Unified Market:
Banking Issues, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1338, 1339 (Oct. 5, 1988).
175. Id.
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177. BROTHERS GRIMM, The Magic Table, the Gold Donkey, and the Club in the Sack, in
THE COMPLETE FAIRY TALES 134 (1987) (BR.DER GRIMM, Tischchen Deck Dich Goldesel
und Kntippel aus dem Sack in DIE KINDER- UND HAUSMXRCHEN (1812)) (KHM 36).
178. See supra note 132.
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tions and, if so, whether it will construe such a requirement
very narrowly to prohibit institutions from countries with dif-
ferent bank regulatory policies access to the banking market in
the EEC. It is difficult to see how the Commission would apply
such an EEC-wide "mirror-image" reciprocity requirement,
because in fact the Second Directive does not harmonize the
banking laws of the different Member States. It is hoped that
the EEC's intention is merely to protect EEC banks from being
denied access to foreign markets in a discriminatory way.
However, non-EEC banks that have a subsidiary in a Mem-
ber State that is authorized as a credit institution before the
entry into force of the Second Directive benefit from the Sec-
ond Directive without being subject to the reciprocity require-
ment. It would, therefore, be advisable for a non-EEC bank
intending to participate in the EEC market to have an EEC
credit institution subsidiary in place before the Second Direc-
tive is enacted and certainly before 1992.
Non-EEC banks wishing to establish or acquire an EEC
credit institution in order to benefit from the Second Directive
will have to choose the Member State in which to do so. This
decision will mainly be determined by three questions:
1) How broad are the banking powers in the Member
State in question?
2) What is the business environment and infrastructure
that the Member State in question can offer?
3) What is the tax situation in the Member State in ques-
tion?
Due to comprehensive pressure, major differences in the
Member States are likely to erode in the course of time. But a
prudent choice of the Member State that offers the best oppor-
tunities for a particular business strategy might permit an insti-
tution to secure a head start over competitors.
Finally, since each EEC credit institution will be able to
provide services throughout the EEC, the Second Directive
raises the question whether a non-EEC bank already having
more than one credit institution subsidiary in the EEC should
merge its subsidiaries into a single institution that can offer its
services throughout the EEC and establish branches in other
Member States.
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